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A REASSESSMENT OF THE SELLING
REAL ESTATE BROKER'S AGENCY
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PURCHASER
JOSEPH M. GROHMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Real property sellers have traditionally utilized real estate
brokerage services to sell their properties.' Typically, the seller and
broker enter into a listing agreement which expressly authorizes
the broker to act as the seller's exclusive agent2 in selling the speci-
fied property.s This broker is commonly referred to as a listing
broker.4 One of the listing broker's responsibilities is to inform
others of the seller's desire to convey the property. The listing bro-
© Joseph M. 'Grohman
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' See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION STAFF REPORT, THE RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE BRO-
KERAGE INDUSTRY 7 (1983) [hereinafter FTC REPORT]. The Federal Trade Commission
("FTC" or "Commission") undertook this report beginning in 1978 in response to criticisms
of the brokerage industry. Id. at 1. The purpose of the report was "to explain how competi-
tion works in [the] industry and how the consumer is served in the real estate brokerage
process." Id.
Eighty-one percent of single family home sellers engage the services of real estate bro-
kers. Id. at 8. See generally 10 P. ROHAN, B. GOLDSTEIN & C. BOBIs, REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE
LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.01 (1987) (discussion of the history of realtor organizations and the
evolution of the brokerage system) [hereinafter ROHAN, GOLDSTEIN & BOBIS]; Comment, The
Real Estate Broker's Fiduciary Duties: An Examination of Current Industry Standards
and Practices, 12 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 145, 145-58 (1984) (discussion of industry in light of
FTC REPORT) [hereinafter Comment, Broker's Fiduciary Duties].
2 See FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 4 (defining an exclusive agent). See, e.g., SNML
Corp. v. Bank of N.C., 41 N.C. App. 28, 37, 254 S.E.2d 274, 279 (1979) (a person who,
through another's authority, undertakes to conduct or manage another's business or affairs
is an agent); Stephenson v. Golden, 279 Mich. 710, 735, 276 N.W. 849, 858 (1937) (brokers
included as agents).
' See FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 10. This form of a listing contract may provide the
broker with an "exclusive right-to-sell" the listed property. Id. Under this popular type of
agreement, if anyone other than the listing broker locates a buyer - even the seller - the
broker is still entitled to the commission. See G. SIEDEL, REAL ESTATE LAW 157 (1979). See
also Comment, Broker's Fiduciary Duties, supra note 1, at 147-49 (contrast of different
listing contracts).
4 See FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 7.
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ker often accomplishes this by registering the property with a mul-
tiple listing service ("MLS").5 This service aids the listing broker
in informing other MLS members of the pertinent facts regarding
the property and the sale. As a result, access to the MLS is one of
the most important services a broker could offer to a client.' Usu-
ally, when a cooperating MLS member, working with a potential
purchaser, prepares to make an offer on the listed property, the
cooperating or selling broker is deemed a subagent s of the listing
broker.9 Generally, subagents are in a fiduciary relationship with
their principals.' 0 As a result, they owe their principal - the seller
1 Id. As set forth in the FTC Report, a multiple listing service ("MLS") is one "oper-
ated by a local group of brokers [as] an information sharing or exchange mechanism" for the
listing service's members only. Id. Of those sellers using brokers, ninety-two percent have
their properties listed with a MLS. Id. at 8.
6 See id. at 29. Access to the MLS is limited almost universally to brokers who have
become MLS members. The public is restricted from having direct access to the MILS. Id.
See also ROHAN, GOLDSTEIN & BOBIS, supra note 1, § 2.04 (overview of the MLS system's
history and development, including analysis of the 1983 FTC REPORT).
7 For this discussion's purposes, a selling or cooperating broker is one who has no prior
relationship with the seller regarding the subject property. Their activity regarding the sub-
ject property arises from a prospective purchaser's interest, and any cooperation with an-
other broker would involve a broker who has a listing agreement with the seller - the
listing broker.
8 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 5(1) (1957). The Restatement defines a sub-
agent as "a person appointed by an agent empowered to do so, to perform functions under-
taken by the agent for the principal, but for whose conduct the agent agrees with the princi-
pal to be primarily responsible." Id. See also H. REUSHLEIN & W. GREGORY, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 2, at 4-5 (1979) (nature of principal, agent and
subagent relationship).
As a result of the subagent relationship, the agent will usually be liable to the principal
for the subagent's actions regarding agency matters. See, e.g., Demian, Ltd. v. Frank As-
socs., 671 F.2d 720, 723 (2d Cir. 1982); Rayden Eng'g Corp. v. Church, 337 Mass. 652, 661,
151 N.E.2d 57, 62 (1958). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 406 (1957) (absent
agreement to contrary, agent responsible to principal for subagent's conduct with reference
to principal's affairs). There are courts, however, which hold that a subagency under a MLS
agreement is not a subagency for such liability. See, e.g., Wise v. Dawson, 353 A.2d 207, 209
(Del. Super. Ct. 1975).
The subagent either may be the agent's employee or one who is not the agent's em-
ployee but who is engaged by the agent for a specific undertaking. See RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF AGENCY § 5(1) comment c (1957).
9 See FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 18.
10 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 5(1) comment d (1957); see also Kruse v.
Miller, 143 Cal. App. 2d 656, 660, 300 P.2d 855, 857-58 (1956) (cooperating broker who had
no relationship with principal regarding the listing or sale of a property was subagent since
he was acting with listing agent's permission); Rayden Eng'g, 337 Mass. at 661, 151 N.E.2d
at 63 (application of subagency doctrine); W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY §
3B (1964) [hereinafter SEAvEY, AGENCY HANDBOOK] ("[A] principal is one who has permitted
or directed another to act for his benefit and subject to his direction or control."). See gen-
erally Seavey, Subagents and Subservants, 68 HARV. L. REV. 658, 666-67 (1955).
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- the same duties as those which an agent owes the principal."
Without expressly agreeing to retain a broker as their agent,
purchasers may also utilize a broker's services to locate property
which they may opt to purchase. The real estate broker, in many
cases, is the purchaser's sole source of expertise and material infor-
mation regarding real property purchases.12 Often, this broker is
not the same as the seller's listing broker.' 3 First, the broker will
attempt to interest the purchaser in property listed with his office.
If successful, he will not have to share the sales commission with
an outside broker. If unsuccessful, the broker will try to interest
the purchaser in property listed with the MLS. If successful in this
attempt, the broker will be referred to as the "selling" or "cooper-
ating" broker for that property even though another broker's office
had originally listed it. 14 As a result, the brokers will share the
commission. 5 Once the buyer has located a property in which he is
interested, the selling broker normally aids the buyer in determin-
ing the terms of his offer and then assists the buyer in presenting
the offer to the seller, usually through the listing broker.'"
A clear distinction exists between the listing broker and the
selling broker. It is the seller of real property who usually initiates
the relationship with the listing broker. It is the purchaser who
typically initiates the relationship with the selling broker. For
some time, federal courts, state courts, professional real estate or-
ganizations, sellers, and purchasers have questioned the status of
the selling broker's relationship and his duties to the real estate
,1 See Rayden Eng'g, 337 Mass. at 661, 151 N.E.2d at 62-63 (citing RESTATEMENT OF
AGENCY § 5 comment c (1957)). A subagent has the same duties to a principal as an agent if
the subagent knows of the ultimate principal. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 428(1)
(1957). The subagent's duties to the principal, however, do not include those agent duties
dependent upon a contractual obligation. Id.
12 See North, Identity Crisis Realtors Style, REAL EST. TODAY (Nov.-Dec. 1973). See
also Comment, Dual Agency in Residential Real Estate Brokerage: Conflict of Interest and
Interests in Conflict, 12 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 379, 381 (1982) (broker often gives pur-
chaser financial advice as well); Comment, A Reexamination of the Real Estate Broker-
Buyer-Seller Relationship, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 1343, 1343 (1972) (suggesting that purchaser-
broker relationship is similar to attorney-client relationship as one relies on another's ac-
quired skill and expertise) [hereinafter Comment, A Reexamination].
13 See FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 8. According to the FTC Report and the survey
conducted by the National Family Opinion, Inc. ("NFO"), of those real estate sales involv-
ing brokers, sixty-six percent involved a selling or cooperating broker. Id. Therefore, in no
more than one-third of residential brokerage transactions would there be a single broker.
14 See id. at 7.
" See id. For a discussion of Commission rates and split schedules, see id. at 133-37.
See id. at 7, 9.
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purchaser. Absent a specific contractual relationship, case law gen-
erally concludes and authors opine that the selling broker is the
seller's subagent and not the purchaser's agent.1" Therefore, he has
little, if any, fiduciary obligation to the purchaser.' 8 The real estate
broker's primary obligation to the purchaser is to deal honestly
and fairly with him.19 This obligation, rather than emanating from
an agency relationship, arises, at least partially, from the position
of public trust which brokers occupy,20 and is supported by their
virtual monopoly in real estate sales.2 As a result, the purchaser,
without an attorney, is the least protected and most vulnerable
party in a real estate transaction.2 The primary exception to this
principle is reflected in case law regarding brokers' liability to pur-
' See Fennell v. Ross, 289 Ark. 374, 379, 711 S.W.2d 793, 796 (1986); Santaniello v.
Department of Professional Regulation, 432 So. 2d 84, 85 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); cf.
Frisell v. Newman, 71 Wash. 2d 520, 659, 429 P.2d 864, 869 (1967) (selling broker is sub-
agent of listing broker). In Santaniello, the court stated that the selling broker was the
seller's agent even though the broker and the seller never met before the broker presented
the buyer's offer to the seller. Santaniello, 432 So. 2d at 85. The court seemed to predicate
its conclusion on the seller's responsibility to pay the broker's commission. Id. at 85. See
also Sinclair, The Duty of the Broker to Purchasers and Prospective Purchasers of Real
Property in Illinois, 69 ILL. B.J. 260, 260 (1981) (broker traditionally owes fiduciary duty
only to seller).
Authors, however, have come to criticize this conclusion. See, e.g., Currier, Finding The
Broker's Place In The Typical Residential Real Estate Transaction, 33 U. FLA. L. REv. 655,
673-81 (1981) (stressing necessity of evaluating alternative methods of dealing with the legal
relations among all parties); Comment, A Reexamination, supra note 12, at 1362 (conclud-
ing there should be a reexamination of the agency doctrine because of fiduciary nature of
broker-buyer relationship). But see Romero, Theories of Real Estate Broker Liability: Ari-
zona's Emerging Malpractice Doctrine, 20 ARiz. L. REv. 767, 773 n.33 (1978) (noting seller is
agent of buyer).
" See Comment, The Real Estate Broker-Purchaser Relationship: Louisiana and
Common Law, 52 TuL. L. REv. 157, 160-61 (1977) (in theory, if vendor engaged broker to
find property, no fiduciary duty to anyone but the vendor). But see Harper v. Adametz, 142
Conn. 218, 227, 113 A.2d 136, 138 (1955) (while broker not agent of purchaser, could not
deliberately deceive buyer); Sifer v. Gunn, 117 Ga. App. 325, 326, 160 S.E.2d 427, 428-29
(1968) (fiduciary relationship existed between broker and purchaser).
10 See Gerber v. Keyes Co., 443 So. 2d 199, 200 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Sawyer Re-
alty Group, Inc. v. Jarvis Corp., 89 Ill. 2d 379, 386, 432 N.E.2d 849, 852 (1982).
20 See Funk v. Tifft, 515 F.2d 23, 25 (9th Cir. 1975); Zichlin v. Dill, 157 Fla. 96, 97, 25
So. 2d 4, 5 (1946); Sawyer, 89 Ill. 2d at 386, 432 N.E.2d at 852; Amato v. Latter & Blum,
Inc., 227 La. 537, 542, 79 So. 2d 873, 876 (1955).
21 Zichlin, 157 Fla. at 98, 25 So. 2d at 4.
22 See Harney, Is the Real Estate Agent on the Buyer's Side?, Miami Herald, July 20,
1986, at (9H), (1-5); Comment, A Reexamination, supra note 12, at 1343; Comment, Caveat
Emptor! The Doctrine's Stronghold, 1 WILLAMErE L.J. 369, 369 (1960) ("The doctrine of
caveat emptor, while nearly abolished so far as the sale of personal property is concerned,
continues to exist and even to thrive in the law of real estate.").
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chasers for misrepresenting matters regarding the sale2 or for fail-
ing to disclose defects in the property.24
After reviewing agency principles in light of the modern real
estate transaction, it is opined that the selling broker is, under
many circumstances, the purchaser's agent. Although it may be
that various issues raised in this article apply to real estate brokers
other than the selling or cooperating broker, the discussion will fo-
cus solely on the question of whether, in a typical real estate trans-
action involving a selling or cooperating broker, there are enough
facts to establish the legal criteria for determining that an agency
relationship exists between the selling broker and the purchaser.2
To analyze this question, this Article will review existing
agency law most applicable to real estate transactions generally
and to selling brokers specifically. Next, it will analyze principal
and agency elements reflected in the selling broker's relationship
with the purchaser. Finally, it will propose appropriate legal analy-
ses, based upon agency law, for the selling broker's relationship
with the purchaser. It shall be noted that these analyses include
but also extend beyond those circumstances which establish a sell-
ing broker's liability for misrepresenting or not disclosing defects
in the property.
II. REVIEW OF EXISTING CASE LAW
A. Selling Broker's Relationship With Seller and Purchaser
Generally, the case law holds that, unless special factors exist
13 See, e.g., Ward v. Taggart, 51 Cal. 2d 736, 742, 336 P.2d 534, 538 (1959) (fraudulent
misrepresentations to purchaser rendered broker liable); Zichlin, 157 Fla. at 98, 25 So. 2d at
4-5 (action may be maintained by purchaser against broker for misrepresentations).
" Lingsch v. Savage, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 736, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 204 (1963) (broker
may be jointly liable with seller if he knows of defects which buyer cannot diligently dis-
cover, and such defects are not revealed).
At least one jurisdiction burdened the broker with the responsibility for inspecting resi-
dential property on the buyer's behalf to determine the existence of any defects in the prop-
erty. See Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 102, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 390 (1984).
See also Merrill v. Buck, 58 Cal. 2d 552, 561, 375 P.2d 304, 310-11, 25 Cal. Rptr. 456, 462-63
(1962) (duty of care on realtor to warn potential tenant of any concealed dangers on the
property). See generally Annotation, Real-Estate Broker's Liability to Purchaser for Mis-
representation or Nondisclosure of Physical Defects in Property Sold, 46 A.L.R.4th 546,
555-63 (1986) (general overview of broker's duty to inspect).
25 See, e.g., Comment, Broker's Fiduciary Duties, supra note 1, at 154-76 (analysis and
evaluation of broker-buyer relationships and suggestions for change); Comment, A Reexami-
nation, supra note 12, at 1343-54 (same).
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to determine otherwise, the selling broker is the seller's agent.26 As
a result of this agency relationship, the selling broker owes a fidu-
ciary duty to the seller. It is interesting to note that this view is
consistent with that of the National Association of Realtors("NAR").8
Courts have based their decisions regarding subagency in real
estate transactions on two different theories. Some courts have
stated that a real estate broker exercises discretionary functions on
the seller's behalf and, therefore, the broker may delegate his du-
ties to a subagent only if the seller has given specific authoriza-
tion.2 9 Other courts have stated that because the real estate bro-
ker's functions are ministerial, the broker may delegate his duties
to a subagent unless the seller specifically directs him not to do
so.30 At least one author has suggested that since it is common
practice for real estate brokers to authorize other brokers to coop-
erate with them, one should presume authorization to delegate ex-
ists absent a clear indication by the seller to the contrary."
The Colorado Supreme Court best expressed the majority po-
sition in Stortroen v. Beneficial Finance Co. 3 2 In Stortroen, the
court, in determining the time sequence of acceptances and coun-
teroffers, was presented with the issue of whether a cooperating
broker under an MLS was the listing broker's subagent and, there-
fore, the seller's agent.3 The court gave several traditional reasons
for finding the selling broker to be the seller's agent. The court
reasoned that where a listing agreement would allow the listing
broker to register the property with a multiple listing service, the
listing broker, by placing the property with a MLS, offers a sub-
agency to any selling or cooperating broker who can procure a pur-
26 See FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 180.
27 See generally Comment, A Reexamination, supra note 12, at 1356-57 (fiduciary du-
ties to seller from broker arise from listing contract as well as from broker's position of trust
and confidence).
26 See FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 14. The NAR is the country's largest professional
association in real estate brokerage and operates approximately ninety-five percent of the
MLSs in the United States. Id. at 15.
21 See F. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 83 (4th ed. 1952).
20 Id. at 53 n.81.
21 Id.
22 736 P.2d 391 (Colo. 1987) (en banc). For a case holding similarly where there was no
MLS listing involved, see Kruse v. Miller, 143 Cal. App. 2d 656, 659, 300 P.2d 855, 857-58
(1956) (cooperating broker acted at listing broker's request).
22 See Stortroen, 736 P.2d at 395.
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chaser. 4 The court relied on the fact that the entire business
structure of a real estate transaction would emanate from the
agreement between the listing broker and all of the other members
in the MLS 5
A second reason advanced by the court was that if one were to
find indicia of an agency relationship between the selling broker
and the purchaser, one inevitably would find a dual agency rela-
tionship involving the seller and purchaser as the principals and
the selling broker as the dual agent. 6 The Stortroen court stated
that a dual agency in such transactions is fraught with potential
conflicts of interest.3 7
Finally, the court reasoned that a finding of an agency rela-
tionship between the selling broker and the purchaser based solely
on the parties' interactions may not, in actuality, act to benefit the
purchaser. 8 To support this conclusion, the court proffered two
examples. Traditionally, a purchaser may rescind an agreement
with the seller because of the seller's agent's misrepresentation if
the seller ratified the agent's acts. If the selling broker is deemed
the purchaser's agent, but is also the party responsible for such
misrepresentation, the purchaser would have no such remedy
against the seller since the reclassification of the parties would
render the ratification doctrine inapplicable. 9
Secondly, agency law provides that if an agent breaches a duty
to the principal, the principal may, as one remedy, require the
agent to return all compensation that the agent received for the
particular transaction. However, the Stortroen court noted that as
the purchaser does not pay the real estate commission, the pur-
chaser's legal position would not be enhanced by the finding of an
' Id. at 397.
35 Id. The court realized that the business relationship between the seller, listing bro-
ker, and MLS members is derived from the listing contract, whereas the purchaser is bound
by no such relationship. Id. at 397-98. See also Note, Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson: A
Reexamination of the Broker-Buyer-Seller Relationship in New Jersey, 23 RUTGERS L. REV.
83, 99-100 (1968).
'" Stortroen, 736 P.2d at 398.
" Id. The court noted that under the Colorado law, a real estate broker is prohibited
from acting for both the buyer and seller in the same real estate transaction absent consent.
Id. (construing Finnerty v. Fritz, 5 Colo. 174, 175-76 (1879)).
38 Id.
" Id. at 399 (citing Romero, supra note 17, at 773 n.33). Note, however, that this does
not mean that the purchaser would have no action against the broker for the misrepresenta-
tion. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 100 (1957) (effects of ratification).
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agency relationship.4"
Therefore, based on the above, the Stortroen court refused to
find an agency relationship between the selling broker and the pur-
chaser without an express written agreement.4' To reach this con-
clusion, the court reasoned that "[t]he prevailing perception of the
broker as an agent of the seller is too firmly imbedded in the real
estate business to permit such a finding [of agency between the
selling broker and the purchaser] on the basis of conduct alone." '42
Certainly, some courts have accepted the proposition that a
real estate broker has a duty to exercise reasonable care so as to
protect the interests of those whom the broker is attempting to
persuade to enter into the contemplated transaction. 3 However,
this duty falls short of that which is owed by an agent to his prin-
cipal.44 Therefore, these holdings do not afford the purchaser the
same protection that the seller typically receives from an agent.
B. Creating the Agency Relationship
The existence of an agency relationship is a question of fact,
unless the facts can be interpreted in only one way.45 It arises, gen-
erally, where one person manifests his intention that another shall
act on his behalf, the other person consents to such, and the party
for whom the other acts has the right to control the ultimate direc-
tion of the cooperative effort.46
Thus, there are three elements necessary to create this rela-
tionship.4 7 The first is the principal's manifestation of his intent
40 Stortroen, 736 P.2d at 399 (citing Romero, supra note 17, at 773 n.33).
41 Stortroen, 736 P.2d at 400.
42 Id.
4' See Merrill v. Buck, 58 Cal. 2d 552, 562, 375 P.2d 304, 311, 25 Cal. Rptr. 456, 463
(1962); Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 102, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 390 (1984);
Earp v. Nobmann, 122 Cal. App. 3d 270, 289, 175 Cal. Rptr. 767, 780 (1981); Amato v.
Rathbun Realty, Inc., 98 N.M. 231, 232, 647 P.2d 433, 434 (Ct. App. 1982). See generally
ROHAN, GOLDSTEIN & BOBIS, supra note 1, § 3.07 (discussing cases imposing duties on bro-
kers vis-h-vis the purchaser).
" See infra notes 65-71.
"' See Thayer v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 55 Cal. 2d 430, 438, 360 P.2d 56, 62, 11 Cal. Rptr.
560, 566, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 826 (1961); Brokaw v. Black-Foxe Military Inst., 37 Cal. 2d
274, 278, 231 P.2d 816, 818 (1951).
46 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1957). See also Brown v. Schmitz, 237
Iowa 418, 424, 22 N.W.2d 340, 343 (1946) (insufficient evidence to warrant finding agency
relationship); W. SEAVEY. H. REUSCHLEIN & L. HALL, CASES ON AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 1-4
(1962) (scope and purpose of agency).
17 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 comment b (1957).
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that the agent shall act for him.4 Except for consent to execute
instruments under seal or to conduct transactions as applicable
statutes specify, one may authorize another to act on his behalf
either by written or spoken words or by conduct through which
another may reasonably believe that such authorization to act was
given.4 9
The second element is that the agent accepts the responsibil-
ity. 0 As with the principal's consent, no specific words are neces-
sary to find such an acceptance. Where one finds that the principal
communicated to the purported agent his desire that the agent act
on his behalf and the agent proceeded to act as requested without
communicating to the principal by words or action that he did not
intend to act on the principal's behalf, the principal may reasona-
bly infer from the agent's performance that he performed on the
principal's behalf.51
The final element dictates that the principal has the right to
control the venture. In considering this aspect, one must note that
control does not necessarily extend to the agent's specific acts. The
principal may exercise his right to control before the agent acts, at
the time the agent acts, at both times, or he need not even exercise
this control.2 For an agency relationship to exist, the principal
needs only to establish the right to control the ultimate direction
in which business is conducted, not the act itself. Therefore, the
principal may have no control over the physical acts of an agent
" See id. § 15. Such manifestation by the principal is essential to creating an agency
relationship. Id. See id. at comment a for a further discussion of manifestation. See also
Schroeder v. Mauzy, 16 Cal. App. 443, 449, 118 P. 459, 462 (1911) (agent transacts another's
business or manages another's affairs through the other's authority to do so, and accounts to
the other for such).
11 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 26 (1957). The primary aspect is the act of
manifestation by the principal that the agent shall act on his account. Id. at comment a.
What the principal intends is not important in deciding whether there is a principal and
agency relationship. Id. Silence may also be a manifestation. See id. at comment d.
The Restatement's comments explain that authority to act, as an element of a principal
and agency relationship, arises from the principal's express statement of such authority to
the agent; from the principal's directing the agent to perform acts that include those acts in
question; or from the principal's behaving in such a way that the principal should reasona-
bly know that he is indicating to the agent that the agent is to perform on the principal's
behalf. Id. at comment c.
" See id. § 15 comment c. See also H. HENN, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP AND OTHER UNIN-
CORPORATED BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 19 (1972) (rules on creation of agency).
5' See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 15 comment b & illustration 3 (1957).
62 See id. § 14 comment a.
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such as a broker or others similarly employed. 3 As long as the
agency agreement does not specify exactly how the agent is to per-
form and the extent to which the agent must obey the principal,
the principal may not interfere with how the agent conducts the
actions which are customarily within the agent's control. 4
It is to be noted that these elements do not include the par-
ties' intent to create an agency.55 Rather, they require the parties'
consent that the relationship's consequences will be binding. Also,
a belief by the parties that they have created an agency is not nec-
essary. There need only be the manifestation of an agreement, not
necessarily a contract, to which the legal consequences of an
agency may attach. 6 If such manifestations exist, an agency rela-
tionship is formed 57 even though neither the principal nor the
agent receives consideration. An agency relationship may also
arise where the agent acts gratuitously. To determine whether a
gratuitous agency exists, two essential elements must be found.
First, the purported agent must have expressly promised to act on
the principal's behalf or must have behaved in such a way that the
principal should have reasonably inferred that the agent would act
for the principal. Second, the agent's promise or actions must
01 See id. But see id. § 385(1) (agent under duty to obey all of principal's reasonable
directions); id. § 220(2)(a) (factor in determining whether relationship is principal-agent or
master-servant is degree of control over work details). It must be noted, however, that to
determine the work direction we must look to business custom. Id. § 385(1) comment a.
U See id. § 14 comment a.
15 See id. § 15. See also Huckabee v. Pullman Co., 8 F.2d 43, 45 (S.D. Ga. 1925); Busby
v. Walker, 84 So. 2d 304, 308 (La. Ct. App. 1955).
16 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1) comment c (1957). See also In re Shul-
man Transp. Enter., 744 F.2d 293, 295 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 1(1) (1957)); Huckabee, 8 F.2d at 45; Standford v. Kuwait Airways Corp., 648 F.
Supp. 1158, 1162 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Brown v. Schmitz, 237 Iowa 418, 424, 22 N.W.2d 340, 343
(1946).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1) comment b (1957).
' See id. § 16. See also Thorton v. Budge, 74 Idaho 103, 106, 257 P.2d 238, 240 (1953)
(quoting Gorton v. Doty, 57 Idaho 792, 792, 69 P.2d 136, 136-37 (1937)).
, See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 378 (1957). See, e.g., Simmerson v. Blanks,
149 Ga. App. 478, 254 S.E.2d 716 (1979) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 378
(1957)); Abresch v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 246 Minn. 408, 75 N.W.2d 206 (1956); Estes
v. Lloyd Hammerstad, Inc., 8 Wash. App. 22, 503 P.2d 1149 (1972).
In Estes, a real estate broker promised to arrange to have the seller's fire insurance
transferred into the purchaser's name. However, the broker negligently failed to do so
before fire damaged the property. Recognizing that the undertaking was gratuitous, the
court found that the promise to act rendered the broker the purchaser's agent for the lim-
ited purpose of transferring the insurance. Estes, 8 Wash. App. at 25, 503 P.2d at 1151.
Since the purchaser relied on the broker's gratuitous promise, and as a result, suffered dam-
ages, the broker was held liable for failing to act. See id.
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have caused the principal to refrain from acting on his own, or
from having a third person perform on his behalf.6 0 Once an
agency relationship arises under these facts, the agent is obligated
to perform within the accepted standard of care61 or advise the
principal, at such a time when the principal may obtain alternative
representation, that he will not act on the principal's behalf.62
C. The Agent's Powers and Duties
Once an agency relationship exists, the agent is empowered to
bind the principal to third parties and to alter the principal's rela-
tionships with them. s In a real estate transaction, however, even
the listing broker does not usually have the power to bind the
seller by signing the contract of sale on behalf of the seller.6 4
The agent's duties are readily apparent. He is in a fiduciary
relationship with the principal with respect to those matters which
fall within the agency's scope.6 5 The agent must act, as to those
0 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 378 comment a (1957); supra note 57.
61 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 378 comment a (1957); id. § 379(2). See,
e.g., Spindler v. Krieger, 16 Ill. App. 2d 131, 145, 147 N.E.2d 457, 464 (1958); Desfosses v.
Notis, 333 A.2d 83, 87 (Me. 1975); Isham v. Post, 141 N.Y. 100, 107, 35 N.E. 1084, 1085
(1894); Lawall v. Groman, 180 Pa. 532, 539, 37 A. 98, 99 (1897).
The purported agent may be liable in contract or in tort. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 379(2) and comment e (1957). Contractually, a promisor is bound by a promise
which is reasonably expected to induce the promisee to act or refrain from acting and where
nonenforcement of the promise would result in an injustice. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 9.0 (1982). A promise may be inferred from the purported promisor's conduct.
See id. § 4.
Under tort principles, if the recipient of a gratuitous promise relies on such promise to
his detriment, and the promisor should have known of the reliance, the promisor will be
liable for any resulting harm. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965).
62 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 378 (1957). See, e.g., Simmerson, 149 Ga.
App. at 479, 254 S.E.2d at 718 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 378 (1957)).
63 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 12 comment a (1957). The agent's exercise
of his power to bind may result in the principal's acquisition of new interests, as where the
agent has the authority to purchase goods on the principal's behalf. See id.
6 See, e.g., Holland v. Hannan, 456 A.2d 807, 817 (D.C. 1983) (well-settled principle
that broker cannot bind seller to contract of sale); Carroll v. Action Enter., Inc., 206 Neb.
204, 208, 292 N.W.2d 34, 36 (1980) (broker has no authority to enter binding contract of
sale).
6 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13 (1958). See also SNML Corp. v. Bank of
N.C., 41 N.C. App. 28, 36, 254 S.E.2d 274, 280 (1979) (agent's duties owed to principal arise
from agency relationship). Some have even analogized the agency relationship and the at-
tendant agent's obligations to that of a trust and the trustee's obligations to the benefi-
ciaries. Giordano v. Stubbs, 228 Ga. 125, 184 S.E.2d 165, cert. denied, 405 U.S. 908 (1971).
See generally Levin, Real Estate Agent Liability for Creative Financing Failures, 39
U. MIAMI L. REV. 429, 432-34 (1985) (discussion of real estate agent's obligations to his
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matters within the agency, primarily for the principal's benefit.
This obligation includes: making reasonable efforts to accomplish
the objectives of the agency;6 exercising the standard of care and
skill common to the locality for the matters within the agency and
utilizing any special skill that the agent possesses; 7 accounting for
profits arising from the agency's activities;"8 not acting for or on
account of one whose interests are adverse to the principal's; 9 not
competing with the principal for the agent's benefit or for a third
party's benefit with respect to matters within the agency;70 dealing
fairly with the principal in all matters between them; not acting
contrary to the principal's reasonable instructions in agency mat-
ters;71 not disclosing confidential information given to him by the
principal or with respect to matters within the agency's scope;72
and disclosing to the principal all facts within the agent's knowl-
edge or which the agent may discover that may be material to
agency matters.73 The gratuitous agent has the same scope of du-
ties to the principal as does a compensated agent.7 4
principal).
" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 377 comment b (1957).
7 See id. § 379(1). See -also I. Cohen Sons, Inc. v. Dowd, 103 Colo. 211, 214, 84 P.2d
830, 831 (1938); Northern Ry. Co. v. Minnesota Transfer Ry. Co., 219 Minn. 8, 12, 16
N.W.2d 894, 896 (1944).
'8 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 382 (1957).
"' See id. § § 23, 24. An agent may act for a principal where his interests are adverse to
those of the principal, as long as the agent reveals to the principal the adverse aspect of the
relationship and its scope. Id.
70 See id. § 387 See, e.g., Ehringer v. Brookfield & Assocs., Inc., 415 So. 2d 774, 776
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (violation of fiduciary duty to further agent's interest rather than
principal's); Mitchell v. Allison, 54 N.M. 56, 58, 213 P.2d 231, 233-34 (1949) (broker who
purchases property for himself rather than his principal breaches fiduciary duty); Wendt v.
Fischer, 243 N.Y. 439, 440, 154 N.E. 303, 304 (1926) (agent has duty not to act contrary to
interests of principal).
71 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 385(1) comment a (1957). To determine what is
reasonable, one must look to business custom. Id.
72 Id. § 395. There are matters requiring such confidentiality even after the agency rela-
tionship has terminated. See id. § 396.
3 See id. § 381. See also MacGregor v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 99 So. 2d 709, 712
(Fla. 1958) (duty to inform principal of all pertinent facts); Santaniello v. Department of
Professional Regulation, 432 So. 2d 84, 85 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (principal must be
informed of all facts within agent's knowledge).
7' See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 383 comment e (1957); id. § 387 comment c.
See, e.g., Northern P. Ry. Co. v. Minnesota Transfer Ry. Co., 219 Minn. 8, 12, 16 N.W.2d
894, 896 (1944) (agent not relieved of liability for wrongful acts because he acted gratui-
tously). However, a gratuitous agent is under no duty to obey the principal's instruction
that he remain the principal's agent. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 383 comment
d (1957); id. § 385 comment c (1957).
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III. AGENCY LAW APPLIED To SELLING BROKER AND PURCHASER
A. Elements of an Agency for Hire
With the foregoing in mind, the question is whether an agency
relationship develops between a purchaser and a selling broker in a
modern real estate transaction. Since the existence of an agency
relationship is generally a question of fact, 5 this Article will pre-
sume the existence of the more common selling broker's and pur-
chaser's activities in a real property sale when analyzing the ele-
ments of an agency relationship. It is fairly well recognized that
brokers' functions are rather similar throughout the country.76
The first question is whether the purchaser manifests an in-
tent that the selling broker shall act for him. There is usually no
formal agreement between the purchaser and the selling broker
that the latter shall act for the purchaser. One, therefore, must
look to the selling broker's and purchaser's activities to determine
whether an agency relationship exists between them.
Case law has identified several informal manifestations by
principals that may constitute an expression of this intent. In
Duffy v. Setchell,77 the court noted that, where a purchaser re-
quests the broker's assistance in obtaining a particular piece of
property, the broker is the purchaser's agent for that purpose and
those activities involved in that transaction, even though it is the
seller who will pay the broker's fee.7" In determining that the bro-
ker was the purchaser's agent in this case, the court relied on the
following factors: the purchaser initiated the contact with the bro-
ker; the purchaser asked the broker to approach the property own-
ers to see if they would sell the parcel at the offered price; the
broker had no prior relationship with the sellers regarding the
property; the purchaser considered the broker to be her agent;7"
the broker approached the sellers as the purchaser requested; and
the broker negotiated the terms of the sale until the parties
agreed.80
" See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
76 FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 9.
7 38 Ill. App. 3d 146, 347 N.E.2d 218 (1976).
71 See id. at 149, 347 N.E.2d at 221.
71 See id. at 148, 347 N.E.2d at 220. Note, however, that the principal's opinion that the
agent is her agent is insufficient to create the relationship, unless the factors necessary for
an agency are present.
11 See Duffy, 38 Ill. App. 3d at 148, 347 N.E.2d at 221. Additionally, the court recog-
nized that the broker may also become the seller's agent in the same transaction. Id. For a
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In a modern real estate transaction there are numerous acts by
the purchaser from which one may reasonably infer that the pur-
chaser intends for the selling broker to act on his behalf. Usually it
is the purchaser who approaches the broker, informing him of a
specific property which interests the purchaser or discussing gener-
ally with the broker the purchaser's desires and needs. The pur-
chaser seeks the selling broker's assistance in acquiring the infor-
mation about the specific property or in locating property. The
purchaser seeks the selling broker's assistance in determining the
fair market value of the property. Also, the purchaser relies on the
selling broker's expertise in determining what to include in the of-
fer, such as financing terms, inspection and repair procedures, and
other contingencies. In doing so, the purchaser reveals to the sell-
ing broker some of the most personal aspects of his financial condi-
tion and needs. Thereafter, the purchaser authorizes the selling
broker to deliver the offer to the seller on the purchaser's behalf.
Once the seller accepts the offer, the purchaser often seeks and
relies on the selling broker's advice as to whom to contact for title
examination,81 financing, inspections, and the like. Further, the
purchaser relies on the selling broker's assistance as he "walks
through" the property on or about the sale date to determine the
property's condition for the last time before sale.82 Thus, the pur-
chaser's actions reasonably permit one to infer that the selling bro-
ker is to act on the purchaser's behalf.8 3 More often than not, both
the seller and the purchaser presume from these circumstances
that the selling agent is representing the purchaser.84
The second question is whether the selling broker acts in such
a way as to indicate reasonably to the purchaser that he is con-
senting to act for the purchaser or on his behalf. One may deter-
mine from existing circumstances whether such consent exists.85
Courts have identified various circumstances under which one
may reasonably determine that an agent has impliedly accepted
discussion of the dual agency concept, see infra notes 146-56 and accompanying text.
sI FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 29 n.14.
62 Id. at 182.
83 See Romero, supra note 17, at 772-73.
11 See G. BUTTERS, CONSUMER EXPERIENCES WITH REAL ESTATE BROKERS: A REPORT ON
THE CONSUMER SURVEY OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION's RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE BRO-
KERAGE INVESTIGATION 24-26 (1983) [hereinafter BUTTERS REPORT], reprinted in FTC RE-
PORT, supra note 1, at 14.
15 See supra note 45.
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the principal's offer for the agent to act on the principal's behalf."
Duffy v. Setchell8J 7 addressed this issue where the broker's actions
clearly manifested his consent to act on the purchaser's behalf.
Like the agent in Duffy, the selling broker's involvement in a
modern real estate transaction often begins with the purchaser
contacting the broker; the broker arranging and negotiating the
sale; and generally conducting himself in such a way as to lead the
purchaser to believe that he is acting for the purchaser's benefit.
Additional acts of the selling broker indicate to the purchaser
that he is acting as the purchaser's representative. As previously
noted, the selling broker makes every effort to determine the pur-
chaser's wants and needs and attempts to match them with availa-
ble property. 8 Nevertheless, the broker, unbeknownst to the pur-
chaser, often attempts to direct him first to property listed with
the broker.89 In so doing, however, the broker creates the impres-
sion that he is attempting to help the buyer find what he needs.
When he finally does move to the MLS, the broker again is indi-
cating to the purchaser that he is attempting to locate a property
that meets the purchaser's needs. If the purchaser and broker lo-
cate a property, the broker provides the purchaser with all availa-
ble information posted with the MLS. If requested by the pur-
chaser, the broker will inform him of pertinent data concerning
recent properties sold. 0 The selling broker generally advises the
purchaser as to how to include terms in his offer, such as those
relating to financing, conditions of title, inspections and repairs,
and the like. At the purchaser's direction, the selling broker
presents the offer to the listing broker and seller. In so doing, he
negotiates with them in order to establish terms under which the
seller and purchaser may reach an agreement. Once the parties
enter into a purchase and sale agreement, the selling broker ad-
vises the purchaser of the financing available in the community,
the prevailing interest rates, and any other relevant information.
The selling broker advises the purchaser of available and reputable
inspection companies and title agents.91 Finally, he accompanies
11 See Butler v. Colorado Int'l Pancakes, Inc., 510 P.2d 443, 445 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973);
Goodman v. Woods, 259 A.2d 594, 596 (D.C. 1969); Popejoy v. Eastburn, 241 Iowa 747, 753,
41 N.W.2d 764, 768 (1950).
11 38 Ill. App. 3d 146, 148, 347 N.E.2d 218, 221 (1976).
s' FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 9, 26, 70.
Id. at 14.
90 Id. at 7, 26, 78, 183.
Id. at 28, 29.
[Vol. 61:560
BROKER'S AGENCY RELATIONSHIP
the purchaser when he conducts the final "walk through."
In determining the existence of an agency relationship, the fi-
nal question is whether an understanding exists between the pur-
chaser and the selling broker concerning the purchaser's right to
control the venture. Such control does not necessarily include su-
pervision or direction over the specific steps in the process.92 In a
circumstance where there is an agency relationship with a broker
traditionally having more knowledge than the purchaser in this
field, it would be ludicrous to presume that the principal will direct
the broker's actions in detail. To find an agency relationship, the
control need only relate to the general course or direction of the
agency, and, unless agreed otherwise, the principal need only have
the right to terminate the agency relationship.93 In a real estate
transaction, the seller retains the right to control the relationship
in that he has the right to revoke his offer to sell prior to an un-
conditional acceptance. 94
Likewise, the purchaser has the right to control the relation-
ship with the selling broker. From the outset, the purchaser's goals
provide the selling broker with direction, whether it involves a spe-
cific property or a search of property in a MLS. The purchaser
decides which property to investigate, whether to make an offer,
and the offer's terms. Furthermore, the purchaser may withdraw
the offer before the seller accepts it9" or may accept or reject any
counteroffer.9 6 Therefore, by exercising or failing to exercise ap-
proval of the agreements, the purchaser exerts his right to control
the relationship in the same manner as the seller would.
The question of the extent to which one needs to retain the
right to control the venture for purposes of agency was addressed
in Fort Myers Airways, Inc. v. American States Insurance C0.9
The court recognized that the principal must only retain the right
to control the relationship and not the agent's specific and actual
92 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
'3 See Beckenstein v. Potter & Carrier, Inc., 191 Conn. 120, 133, 464 A.2d 6, 13 (1983);
Fort Myers Airways, Inc. v. American States Ins. Co., 411 So. 2d 883 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982).
" See Smith v. Holmwood, 231 Cal. App. 2d 549, 553, 41 Cal. Rptr. 907, 909 (1965);
Donahue v. Monroe, 147 Ga. App. 835, 836, 250 S.E.2d 571, 572; Wycoff Realty Co. v.
Grover, 198 Kan. 139, 143, 422 P.2d 943, 946 (1967); Ardente v. Horan, 117 R.I. 254, 259,
366 A.2d 162, 165 (1976).
1) See Smith, 231 Cal. App. 2d at 552, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 909.
06 See id. at 553, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
07 411 So. 2d 883 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
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actions.98 To determine whether an agency existed, the court noted
that the principal: determined when the purported agent's actions
would occur on his behalf; received the benefits of the agent's ac-
tions; and retained the power to revoke the authority he extended
to the agent.9 Thus, the court concluded that the flying instructor
was the airplane owner's/flying student's agent while instructing
the owner/student in his airplane.100 The court emphasized that, in
light of the agent's superior skill and knowledge, it would be a
"folly" to have expected the principal to exert significant control
over the agent's specific actions. 10'
The purchaser, however, usually is not present when the sell-
ing broker presents the offer. The purchaser does not make the
appointment for the presentation nor does he take part in the dis-
cussion during the presentation. The selling broker traditionally
does this on his own, with or through the listing broker. Neverthe-
less, the purchaser, as principal, does determine the time when the
selling broker, as agent, may initiate the activities to make the
presentation. Also, the purchaser receives the benefits of the sell-
ing broker's actions. Further, unless he is legally prohibited, the
purchaser can terminate the relationship. 0 2 As noted, throughout
the real estate transaction, the purchaser retains sufficient power
to control the direction of the relationship with the selling broker
to find a non-gratuitous agency.
B. A Gratuitous Agency
Throughout the transaction, the selling broker encourages the
purchaser to rely on the broker's apparent expertise.0 3 He inquires
into the purchaser's personal preferences and financial restraints,
directs the purchaser to available properties within his price
range,'04 and counsels the purchaser on how to structure the offer's
terms. The selling broker conducts the transaction in such a way
that it is natural for the purchaser to rely on him.
11 See id. at 886.
9 See id.
100 See id.
101 See id. (citation omitted).
I02 See text accompanying supra note 99 (discussing analogous control in Fort Myers
Airways).
10. See Comment, Broker's Fiduciary Duties, supra note 1, at 156 ("the very nature of
the relationship between a purchaser and a broker invokes a purchaser's reliance and
trust").
10" See FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 183.
[Vol. 61:560
BROKER'S AGENCY RELATIONSHIP
Even if one-were to view the transaction provincially and as-
sert that the selling broker is acting gratuitously towards the pur-
chaser, it appears that the selling broker's actions encourage the
purchaser to refrain from acting independently with the listing
broker or the seller. His actions also encourage the purchaser to
refrain from obtaining alternative counselling and expertise at
least until the parties have signed the contract, and it is then too
late to obtain expert assistance in negotiating and finalizing the
contract. It must be readily apparent to the broker that this is the
likely result, even if the selling broker is not intentionally encour-
aging the purchaser to refrain from such activity, since so many
purchasers sign purchase and sale agreements without seeking al-
ternative counselling and advice. Therefore, as long as the selling
broker continues to act in such a fashion without advising the pur-
chaser that he is not acting on his behalf, he appears to do so as
the purchaser's agent.10 5
In Groh v. Shelton,1"6 the court found an agency relationship
involving purchasers and one who was to assist them in locating
property.10 7 The Grohs initiated contact with Shelton, who, al-
though not a real estate agent, agreed to assist them in finding
some farm property. After rejecting one parcel which Shelton
found and after being advised that another one which interested
them was unavailable, the Grohs decided to purchase a parcel rec-
ommended by Shelton. To enhance their interest in the property,
Shelton took the Grohs to the property to see it. After they ex-
pressed interest in the property, the Grohs and Shelton discussed
the price and payment terms to offer the sellers. Shelton and his
wife drafted the purchase contract. Notably, there was no evidence
that the purchasers were to compensate Shelton for his efforts.
However, there was some evidence that Shelton told the Grohs
that the seller was going to pay him $100.00 for selling the place. 08
The actual transactions created the need to determine
205 See ROHAN, GOLDSTEIN & Boms, supra note 1, § 3.07[1], at 3-43. See also Eskridge,
One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The Need for Mortgage Rules Consonant with the Eco-
nomic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale and Loan Transaction, 70 VA. L. REV.
1083, 1194-96 (1984) (discussing minimal use of "buyers' agents" by purchasers because of
increased costs and "professional resistance"); Comment, Broker's Fiduciary Duties, supra
note 1, at 156 (added cost and failure to realize they are underrepresented deters purchasers
from hiring separate agents).
106 428 S.W.2d 911 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968).
107 See id. at 916.
1o8 See id. at 914.
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whether Shelton acted as the Grohs' agent. The sellers were willing
to sell the property for $2,500.00. Shelton told the Grohs that the
price was $3,500.00. Since the Grohs did not have the cash neces-
sary to purchase the property, Shelton agreed to lend the Grohs
the difference in exchange for a promissory note and a deed of
trust. At the closing, after the Grohs had executed and delivered
the documents, they discovered the price differential. 109 After-
wards, the Grohs refused to pay any part of the promissory note
that constituted a payment of more than $2,500.00 as a purchase
price. Shelton advertised the farm for sale under the deed of trust
and the Grohs instituted an action to enjoin the foreclosure. 110
In determining whether to enjoin the foreclosure, the court an-
alyzed the dealings between Shelton and the Grohs to ascertain
whether there was an agency relationship. If so, Shelton breached
his duty of advising his principals as to all material facts and to
refrain from competing with them when it came to the agency's
subject matter."' As a first step, the court considered the general
principle that an agency results from one's manifestation to an-
other that the other is to act on his behalf, subject to his control,
and from the other's consenting to act under those circum-
stances." 2 The court also recognized that one may infer such mani-
festation and consent from the parties' words and actions."' On
the facts given, the court found Shelton to be the Grohs' agent
even though neither party may have intended to create the
relationship." 4
A gratuitous agency relationship involving a purchaser, his at-
torney and a seller has arisen under unlikely circumstances. In
Simmerson v. Blanks,115 the court found there were sufficient facts
to send to the jury the question of whether the purchaser's attor-
ney was the seller's agent for limited purposes. 116 After the closing,
the purchaser's attorney gratuitously volunteered to file the financ-
ing statement for the seller. Unfortunately, he misfiled the pa-
per.117 As a result of the attorney's promise and the seller's detri-
109 See id. at 915.
110 See id.
... See id. at 916-17.
12 See id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1957) (defining agency).
113 See Groh, 428 S.W.2d at 916.
"I See id.
.. 149 Ga. App. 478, 254 S.E.2d 716 (1979).
116 See id. at 479, 254 S.E.2d at 717.
.. See id. at 478-79, 254 S.E.2d at 717-18.
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mental reliance on that promise, the court recognized an agency
relationship between the purchaser's attorney and the seller as to
the filing of the financing statement.11
If one can determine that, as a result of a gratuitous promise
and reliance thereon, a gratuitous agency relationship would exist
between an attorney and one whose interests are adverse to his
client, one should be able to identify the same relationship be-
tween the selling broker and the purchaser where the broker un-
dertakes to act in such a way as to cause the purchaser to rely on
the broker's acts. At least one commentator has recognized the
similarities between the broker/buyer relationship and the attor-
ney/client relationship. 1 9 In each situation, the client and the pur-
chaser rely significantly on the attorney's or the broker's perceived
expertise and, as a result, a relationship of "trust and confidence"
arises.1 20
C. Agency for Hire Versus a Gratuitous Agency
It is important to note that, in order for an agent to be a non-
gratuitous agent, one need be acting as another's agent merely for
consideration.'2 ' There appears to be no prerequisite for the prin-
cipal to pay the agent in order to find an agent to be acting for
consideration, although this certainly would be one of several facts
to consider in determining whether the agency exists. In the usual
modern real estate transaction, the selling broker works for a com-
mission. Therefore, there is evidence that the selling broker is act-
ing as a non-gratuitous agent.
Even if one were to require that the principal compensate the
agent for his acts on the principal's behalf, one must recognize that
the purchaser indirectly pays some, if not all, of the broker's com-
mission. 22 Sellers expect often to sell for more and purchasers ex-
pect to pay more for real property transactions involving a bro-
",8 See id. at 479, 254 S.E.2d at 718. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 378
(1957) (discussing gratuitous undertaking).
"I See Comment, A Reexamination, supra note 12, at 1343.
120 Id.
221 See H. REUSHLEIN & IV. GREGORY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNER-
SHIP 140-41 (1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 16 (1957).
122 See BurrERs REPORT, supra note 83, at 21, reprinted in FTC REPORT, supra note 1.
Comment, Broker's Fiduciary Duties, supra note 1, at 155. "The purchase price that the
buyer pays more often than not comprises some, if not all, of the commission fee charged."
Id. (emphasis in original).
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ker.123 By agreeing to pay more than one normally would for the
property, the purchaser agrees, in effect, to compensate the broker.
Furthermore, because the broker receives a commission based on
the purchase price, there is some motivation for the broker to facil-
itate the contract execution and the closing.124 The broker, there-
fore, aids the purchaser's ability to close in order to receive his full
commission.
It should also be noted that regardless of whether one finds
the agency relationship to be non-gratuitous or gratuitous, the
finding of an agency relationship between the selling broker and
the purchaser arises, at least partially, from the realization that the
agent's power to alter the principal's relationship with third parties
exists between a selling broker and purchaser as well as between a
listing broker and a seller. When delivering the purchaser's offer to
the seller and listing broker, the selling broker places the pur-
chaser in the position of being bound to the seller who accepts the
offer as tendered and in the required manner. On the other hand,
even if the listing broker delivers to the seller an offer identical to
the terms under which the seller listed the property, the seller may
refuse to accept the offer. The seller would be liable for the bro-
ker's commission but would not be bound to the prospective
purchaser.
D. The Statute of Frauds Question
Some jurisdictions require by statute that agreements employ-
ing real estate brokers to sell or purchase real estate for compensa-
tion must be in writing and executed by the party against whom it
123 See Comment, Broker's Fiduciary Duties, supra note 1, at 155 (analyzing FTC RE-
PORT and buyers' expectations).
124 Certainly, there is divided case law as to whether the broker may receive the com-
mission once the parties sign the contract of sale or whether they must wait until the parties
close the sale. This question is more relevant to circumstances where it is the seller who is in
default, rather than the buyer. For example, closings in some locales involve purchase and
sale agreements providing that, in the event the buyer defaults and the seller retains the
deposit as liquidated damages, the broker receives one-half of the deposit not to exceed the
full commission due. However, the practical effect is that the broker is still likely to receive
more commission if the parties close the sale.
The majority rule holds that the broker earns his commission by producing "a ready,
able and willing customer on the principal's terms . . . ." ROHAN, GOLDSTEIN & BOBIS,
supra note 1, § 4.02[1], at 4-4 (footnote omitted). The minority rule, announced in Ells-
worth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 236 A.2d 843 (1967), requires a successful closing
as a prerequisite to the receipt of a commission. Ellsworth Dobbs, 50 N.J. at 551, 236 A.2d
at 855.
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is enforced.125 However, it appears that the primary purpose of
such a requirement is to regulate the brokers' activities rather than
to bar an agency relationship from forming unless there is a writ-
ing signed by the party to be charged. 2 6 Therefore, this type of
statutory requirement should not inhibit a court's finding that the
selling broker would be the purchaser's agent under the appropri-
ate circumstances.
E. The MLS and Subagency Question
If the elements of an agency are present in the typical real
estate transaction involving a selling broker and a purchaser, a
problem arises in a situation involving the MLS where it is gener-
ally recognized that the selling broker acts as a subagent of the
listing broker. The problem involves the effect to be given to this
subagency proposition. The NAR, through its MLS program, urges
this subagency theory 27 and courts have recognized it. 28 Despite
its support, accepting this proposition without challenge is sus-
pect.12 9 There appears to be no basis in law to apply such a theory
to the typical modern real estate transaction involving a selling
broker. In fact, there are significant reasons for finding that such is
not the case.
First, the MLS's development had as its primary goals the sta-
bilization of broker's commission schedules and the enhancement
of sale prospects by informing other brokers of property availabil-
ity. 30 In the early part of the twentieth century, real estate brokers
regularly cut commissions to induce sellers to list with them.' 3'
The MLS encouraged the brokers to cooperate rather than com-
122 See, e.g., PMH Properties v. Nichols, 263 N.W.2d 799, 802 n.3 (Minn. 1978) and
statutes cited therein; Carnell v. Watson, 176 Mont. 344, 347, 578 P.2d 308, 310-11 (1978).
12 See PMH Properties, 263 N.W.2d at 802 n.3.
127 FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 15.
128 See Fennell v. Ross, 289 Ark. 374, 379, 711 S.W.2d 793, 796 (1986); Stortroen v.
Beneficial Fin. Co., 736 P.2d 391, 396 (Colo. 1987) (en banc); Frisell v. Newman, 71 Wash.
2d 520, 529, 429 P.2d 864, 869 (1969). See also Romero, supra note 17, at 772; Note,
Agency- Selling Brokers Are Subagents of Sellers in Real Estate Transactions Involving
Multiple Listing Services, 9 U. Aiu. LITTLE: ROCK L.J. 357, 362 (1986-87).
120 Although in the minority, there have been challenges to the general proposition. See
Wise v. Dawson, 353 A.2d 207, 210 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975); Blocklinger v. Schlegel, 58 Ill.
App. 3d 324, 326, 374 N.E.2d 491, 493 (1978); Comment, A Reexamination, supra note 12,
at 1353.
13 NAT'L Ass'N OF REALTORS, HANDBOOK ON MULTIPLE LISTING POLICY (3d ed. 1975)
[hereinafter NAR HANDBOOK]. See FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 17.
"I See FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 110.
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pete once a broker obtained a listing. To accomplish this task, the
MLS required all members to obtain only exclusive rights to sell,
rather than open listings. 13 2 This resolved inherent competition
from sellers as well because this listing gives the broker the right to
a commission even if the seller finds the buyer during the listing. 3 '
Therefore, the MLS boards were designed to assure cooperation
among their participants rather than protection of the seller and
purchaser. 3 4 It is noteworthy that present MLS rules no longer
require minimum commission rates. 3 5
Second, to permit a subagency relationship to exist for the
seller's benefit where the majority of the purchasers believe that
the selling broker represents the purchaser 36 is unacceptable as a
matter of public policy. As noted above, the subagency relationship
primarily facilitates forced cooperation among brokers 7 and exists
basically for the brokers' convenience.138 In the current real estate
setting, the subagency relationship encourages the purchaser to re-
veal material information to the agent of another who is likely to
benefit from these revelations. 3 9 Ultimately, it runs contrary to
the buyers' perceptions which have been fostered by the brokers'
actions.
It has been recognized that the subagency theory applied to
the relationship involving the seller, the listing broker, and the
selling broker is an artificial one. Notably, in the usual subagency
relationship, the agent is responsible to third parties harmed as a
result of the subagent's negligence occurring in furtherance of the
agency's purposes. 4 °
112 See Alleman, Exclusive Listings, CALIF. REAL EST. (Sept. 1952).
133 See FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 111.
134 See Austin, Real Estate Boards and Multiple Listing Systems as Restraints of
Trade, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1329 (1970).
" This must result, at least in part, from the antitrust actions and Justice Department
investigations of the 1960's and 1970's. See FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 109. Current
listing information, however, still includes a reference to what percentage commission a co-
operating broker will receive. See NAR HANDBOOK, supra note 130, at 11-12.
136 See FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 182-84.
'17 See id. 111-12; Austin, supra note 134, at 1325.
'"I See FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 23.
119 See id. at 23-24. Seventy-three percent of the purchasers surveyed said they advised
the broker of the highest price at which they would purchase. Of those, eighty-three percent
thought that the broker would keep the information confidential. Sixty-six percent of the
sellers surveyed said that the brokers advised them of what they thought was the highest
price at which the purchaser would contract to purchase. Id. at 24.
'140 See Romero, supra note 17, at 773 n.33 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§
82, 92, 93, 98-100, 218 (1957)).
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It is interesting to note that in Wise v. Dawson, 4' which re-
flects the Delaware minority rule, the court refused to hold the list-
ing broker liable to the purchasers for the selling broker's misrep-
resentations on an agent-subagent theory. Both brokers were
members of the local MLS. The selling broker assisted the pur-
chasers in finding the property through the MLS book. The court,
however, held that "a multi-list arrangement between listing and
selling agents is not an agency relationship unless clearly proven
otherwise."' 2 The court reasoned that a significant feature of
agency relationships was missing in the typical MLS arrangement.
The listing broker had no control over the selling agent, and by
splitting fees, the agents merely recognized their mutual efforts
and cooperation.'43 Furthermore, it is submitted that perhaps even
the NAR impliedly recognizes the lack of validity in the subagency
notion. In its "Fourteen Points" relating to the MLS, the NAR
prohibits the MLS from granting blanket consent for a selling bro-
ker to negotiate directly with the seller.'
Real estate brokers exert great influence in the market. 4 5
Both purchasers and sellers rely heavily upon their expertise.' 46
The existing confusion about the selling broker's role often results
in the purchaser unwittingly providing the selling broker with ma-
terial information that the selling broker must disclose to the
seller.' 47 Naturally, the seller will use this information to his ad-
vantage and to the buyer's detriment.'4 8 If the broker fails to ad-
vise the seller of such material information, the selling broker has
breached one of his duties as the seller's agent. 49 As a result, he
may have lost his right to receive his commission and created tort
or contractual liability for himself.'50 Therefore, to continue to fos-
ter the theory that the selling broker is solely the seller's subagent
merely perpetuates an anachronistic system that encourages mis-
,4, 353 A.2d 207 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975).
142 Id. at 209.
143 Id.
144 NAT'L ASS'N OF REALTORS, FOURTEEN POINTS, at point 9 (Nov. 15, 1971).
'41 See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
140 Id.
147 See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
148 Id.
149 See ROHAN, GOLDSTEIN & BOBIS, supra note 1, § 3.05[4], at 3-32. "A broker is under
a duty to make full, fair, and prompt disclosure to his client of all material facts within the
broker's knowledge that might affect his client's rights, liabilities or course of action." Id.
(footnote omitted).
1o See Duffy v. Setchell, 38 Ill. App. 3d 146, 149, 347 N.E.2d 218, 222 (1976).
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leading the public. There is little justification for continuing this
arrangement.
Furthermore, some case law and commentators have indicated
that although brokers may have a primary obligation to sellers,
this shall not interfere with their duty to exercise good faith and to
encourage disclosure of material facts to potential purchasers. 5'
An overriding public policy fuels this desire for ethical behavior
and disclosure.152 However, in light of possible uncertainties in the
area, an actual agency relationship must be recognized between
purchasers and selling brokers since some courts are still reticent
about protecting purchasers absent a clear agency relationship. 5 3
IV. AVAILABLE ALTERNATIVES
A. Mandatory Duty to Disclose Subagency to Purchaser
One of the reactions to the assertion that the current system
misleads the real property purchaser is to proffer the idea that the
selling broker must advise the purchaser that he will be acting
solely as the seller's agent. 54 Such a proposition would prove fruit-
less for two reasons.
First, brokers are reluctant to disclose such information to
purchasers. 55 Psychologically, it is to the broker's and seller's ad-
vantage to get the buyer committed in writing as soon as possible.
Advising the purchaser in advance that neither broker represents
him most likely would encourage him to seek alternative represen-
tation and delay the process. This is the antithesis of the sales con-
cept. It is unlikely that many brokers would encourage such activ-
ity. Disclosures probably would be infrequent. This presumption
"I See Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 102, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 390 (1984)
(affirmative duty to inspect and disclose material facts affecting value, desirability of prop-
erty); Sawyer Realty Group, Inc. v. Jarvis Corp., 89 111. 2d 379, 385-86, 432 N.E.2d 849, 852
(1982) (obligation to seller not undermined by duty of good faith and disclosure to pur-
chaser).
52 See Note, Brokers-Real Estate Brokers' Duties to Prospective Purchasers, 1976
B.Y.U. L. REv. 513, 515 (fiduciary relationship between broker and buyer; public policy re-
quires brokers to act ethically); Comment, A Real Estate Broker's Duty to His Purchaser:
Washington State's Position and Some Projections for the Future, 17 GONZ. L. REv. 79, 91-
101 (1981) (tort basis of liability).
153 See Weissman v. Mertz, 128 App. Div. 2d 609, 512 N.Y.S.2d 865, 867 (2d Dep't
1987) (broker not agent of purchaser, therefore, no fiduciary duty is owed), appeal dis-
missed, 69 N.Y.2d 1036, 511 N.E.2d 83, 517 N.Y.S.2d 940 (1987).
See FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 186.
155 See id.
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follows from the brokers' past failures in being open with purchas-
ers and sellers where it appears that such openness in disclosure
would be contrary to the brokers' best interests. For example, bro-
kers have failed to disclose to real estate participants how negotia-
ble real estate commissions might be. 5" Also, they have failed to
advise the parties about each participant's role in the real estate
transaction. 157 Consequently, the purchaser is virtually unaware
that the person upon whom he is relying may actually have inter-
ests adverse to his. So, too, brokers frequently fail to show pro-
spective purchasers homes listed with other brokers who discount
their commissions.158 There is little reason, therefore, to believe
that brokers would be any more informative in disclosing their
subagency relationship than they are presently in disclosing other
information.
Second, a mere revelation that a subagency relationship exists
still fails to provide the purchaser with what he needs. It is neces-
sary to recognize that an agency relationship exists and this will
provide the purchaser with the same advocacy and protection that
the seller receives.
B. Dual Agency
Another response to the problem is to propose the dual agency
theory159 whereby the selling broker would be the agent for both
the seller and the buyer. Again, this theory is unlikely to provide
adequate protection for purchasers.
First, in all but the most basic transactions, there are conflicts
inherent in a dual agency.6 0 The dual agent owes both principals
the same degree of care and duty as if he represented each alone.
He must, as to both, act loyally, act in good faith and fairly, and
openly and fully disclose all relevant facts known to him or which
he should have discovered in carrying out his duties. 6' In many
158 Sellers are woefully unaware of the negotiability of brokers' fees. Perhaps brokers
are reluctant to inform them so as to avoid confronting educated sellers and buyers looking
to negotiate fees. See FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 68.
'11 Id. at 77.
Id. at 159.
See Comment, Broker's Fiduciary Duties, supra note 1, at 162-64.
'10 See Stortroen v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 736 P.2d 391, 398 (Colo. 1987) (en banc); Com-
ment, Broker's Fiduciary Duties, supra note 1, at 175.
,", See Investment Exch. Realty, Inc. v. Hillcrest Bowl, Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 714, 717, 513
P.2d 282, 284 (1973) (en banc). "A broker so unwise as to place himself in the anomalous
position of representing adverse parties must scrupulously observe and fulfill his duties to
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real estate dealings this is an impossibility because of the contrast-
ing motivations of the seller and purchaser,162 and the selling bro-
ker's duty to disclose to each. Likewise, he would have to disclose
to the purchaser the seller's need for sale proceeds.
Moreover, where there are conflicts between the two princi-
pals, the dual agent must obtain the consent of each principal
before embarking on the dual agency.6 3 The basic principle under-
lying this requirement is "to prevent the agent from putting him-
self in a position in which to be honest must be a strain on him,
and to elevate him to a position where he cannot be tempted to
betray his principal."'' 4 Defining the selling agent as a dual agent
in a transaction that is fraught with inherent conflicts, places a
strain on him to be honest and enhances the difficulty of not be-
traying his principal, even though he may betray the principal neg-
ligently. The broker's falling prey to such temptation has resulted
in courts referring to it without citation.' 65
Unfortunately, because of the nature of agency relationships,
one can infer such a relationship in many transactions solely from
the parties' actions. Therefore, the agent may have acted already
without obtaining the necessary consents. Doing so gives each prin-
cipal who did not have prior knowledge of the dual representation
the right to void the agency and the transaction. 66 As a result, a
broker acting in this fashion may have already breached his fiduci-
both." Martin v. Hicken, 340 S.W.2d 161, 165 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960).
162 See ROHAN, GOLDSTEIN & BOBIS, supra note 1, § 3.06, at 3-39.
The interests of the buyer and the seller are naturally antagonistic to each other.
The broker, in undertaking to arrange terms between them, if he favors the
buyer[,] is necessarily disregarding the interest of the seller, and, if he favors the
seller, is necessarily disregarding the interest of the buyer.
Id. (quoting Nahn-Heberer Realty Co. v. Schrader, 89 S.W.2d 142, 144 (Mo. Ct. App. 1936)).
163 See PMH Properties v. Nichols, 263 N.W.2d 799, 802 (Minn. 1978) (quoting Ander-
son v. Anderson, 293 Minn. 209, 216, 197 N.W.2d 720, 724 (1972)); Cogan v. Kidder, Ma-
thews & Segner, Inc., 97 Wash. 2d 658, 662, 648 P.2d 875, 877 (1982) (en banc); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 393 (1957) (agent subject to duty not to compete with
principal unless otherwise agreed).
164 Evans V. Brown, 33 Okla. 323, 324, 125 P. 469, 470 (1912).
10' See Roman v. Lobe, 243 N.Y. 51, 152 N.E. 461 (1926). The court noted that, "[tihe
real estate broker is brought by his calling into a relation of trust and confidence. Constant
are the opportunities by concealment and collusion to extract illicit gains. We know from
our judicial records that the opportunities have not been lost." Id. at 54, 152 N.E. at 462.
"' See Sierra Pac. Indus. v. Carter, 104 Cal. App. 3d 579, 583, 163 Cal. Rptr. 764, 767
(Ct. App. 1980); Bonaccorso v. Kaplan, 218 Cal. App. 2d 63, 68, 32 Cal. Rptr. 69, 72 (Ct.
App. 1963); Schepers v. Lautenschlager, 173 Neb. 107, 119, 112 N.W.2d 767, 774 (1962);
SEAVEY, AGENCY HANDBOOK, supra note 10, § 149.
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ary obligations and lost his right to a commission1 7 by the time he
attempts to obtain each party's consent. It is important to note
that the primary exception to the general dual agency rule is where
the broker acts as a middleman."68
A third problem with the dual agency theory is that the dual
agent must withdraw from representing the principals when a con-
flict between the two arises because he is unable to represent ade-
quately each principal's interests.'6 9 By the selling dual agent's
withdrawal from the agency, the purchaser loses the affirmative
representation he sought and expected. The seller, on the other
hand, may still have the listing broker acting as his agent. There-
fore, such a theory fails to remedy the inequities inherent in the
current system.
C. Purchaser's Agent
Another way to deal with the question is to recognize that ele-
ments already exist in the typical relationship between a purchaser
and a selling broker which make the selling broker the purchaser's
agent. 70 As a result, the purchaser has the agent that he needs and
that both he and the seller already expect him to have. The pur-
chaser's agent would be better able to serve the purchaser without
fear of conflicts of interest or fear of losing his right to reimburse-
ment for failure to obtain the necessary consents for dual agency.
The agent would no longer be faced with the problem of trying to
determine what to disclose and when to withdraw when conflicts
arise in dual agencies. The purchaser then has an agent who will
assist him in determining the best price at which he can obtain the
property, in determining the most favorable terms under which the
seller is willing to convey, in deciding what inspections to have,
and, generally, in taking all usual steps inherent in the prudent
'17 where the dual agent acts without the principal's consent, the principal has the
right to void the transaction. See Taborsky v. Mathews, 121 So. 2d 61, 62 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1960); PMH Properties v. Nichols, 263 N.W.2d 799, 799 (Minn. 1978); Anderson v.
Anderson, 293 Minn. 209, 216, 197 N.W.2d 720, 724 (1972).
"I' See McConnell v. Cowan, 44 Cal. 2d 805, , 285 P.2d 261, 265 (1955). See also Com-
ment, supra note 18, at 160 (although courts reluctant to treat broker as deal agent, if bro-
ker merely brings parties together and lets them conclude matter, can be agent of both).
'6 SEAVEY AGENCY HANDBOOK, supra note 10, § 150.
'17 See Fennell v. Ross, 289 Ark. 374, 379, 711 S.W.2d 793, 798 (1986) (Hays, J., dis-
senting). "In the absence of a listing agreement between the broker and the seller, the bro-
ker should be deemed the agent of the buyer and not the subagent of the listing broker."
Comment, A Reexamination, supra note 12, at 1353.
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purchase of real property.
In recognizing and applying agency principles to the selling
broker-purchaser relationship, the law would balance inequities in-
herent in the existing system.1 7 1 Presently, the seller knows the
most about his property. The broker is expert in comparing the
property in question with similar properties and in discovering ma-
terial information about the property for sale. The typical pur-
chaser not only does not have the seller's information about his
home, but, also, is without the broker's general expertise. Presuma-
bly, the purchaser represented by a broker should fare better in
negotiations for the purchase of property.'
V. THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE INTERVENTION
The court's reasoning in Stortroen v. Beneficial Finance Co.'
evidences the willingness of a majority of courts to apply general
agency propositions to the modern real estate transaction. As a re-
sult, a system is perpetuated that fails to protect a significant
number of participants in the market and encourages actions
which are detrimental to them. For example, the Stortroen court
based its opinion partially on the proposition that the MLS creates
a relationship among the parties that is unchangeable unless the
parties agree to do so expressly in writing.7 4 However, when one
considers that the primary purposes in forming MLS boards is to
encourage fee regulation and anticompetitive cooperation among
brokers, one must question whether the law should permit a sys-
tem to dictate the parties' relationships when it creates a system
that provides the purchaser with minimal protection and permits
its members to mislead the public. Also, the Stortroen court predi-
cated its opinion on the belief that the real estate community's
prevailing perception -is that the broker is the seller's agent.7 5
When considering the selling broker, however, the court's supposi-
tion can be considered contrary to the beliefs of the majority of the
171 The purchaser may not necessarily gain through the recognition of the selling broker
as his agent. See Romero, supra note 20, at 773 n.33 (cited with approval in Stortroen v.
Beneficial Fin. Co., 736 P.2d 391, 398-99 (Colo. 1987) (en banc)). The author suggests that
the buyer will lose remedies presently available to him. See id.
,72 The FTC Consumer Survey indicated that buyers who felt the broker represented
only the seller were much less successful in obtaining a significant decrease between the
seller's asking price and the actual purchase price. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 187, n.554.
... 736 P.2d 391 (Colo. 1987) (en banc).
174 Id. at 400.
175 Id.
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sellers and buyers involved."'
Given the tremendous volume of real estate transactions annu-
ally, and the courts' tendency to change the law slowly, it seems
appropriate for legislatures to act to protect real estate purchasers.
However, because an agency relationship more often than not is a
fact question, it appears to be impossible for one to legislate a sell-
ing broker-purchaser agency. On the other hand, and most impor-
tantly, both sellers and purchasers are misled by the subagency
concept involving the seller and the selling broker. Therefore, the
public needs legislation directed to the subagency purportedly aris-
ing from MLS services. The legislation needs to preclude a sub-
agency relationship between a selling broker and the seller and the
listing broker. Also, it needs to void as a matter of public policy
existing agreements for such agency and subagency arrangements.
Finally, the legislation must provide that it is void as a matter of
public policy to preclude a selling broker from being a purchaser's
agent absent an express agreement otherwise.
VI. CONCLUSION
Most courts find that, in multiple listing arrangements, a sell-
ing broker is the seller's agent through a subagency with the listing
broker. This, however, is contrary to the perceptions of a majority
of purchasers.
The question arises as to whether the premises for the major-
ity's position are founded on sound legal bases. When one exam-
ines the legal principles for finding an implied agency in the typi-
cal real estate transaction, one recognizes that all of the elements
necessary for an agency relationship exist between the selling bro-
ker and the purchaser. As a result, the purchaser usually reveals to
the broker material information which the broker is obligated to
disclose to the seller. Consequently, the seller maintains an unfair
advantage and the purchaser receives little or no real
representation.
It is appropriate, therefore, to analyze the relationship be-
tween the selling broker and the purchaser. In so doing, one must
examine also the MLS requirement that the selling broker act as
the seller's agent through a subagency with the listing broker.
Since this requirement is completely contrary to the evidence of an
agency relationship that appears between the selling broker and
176 See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
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the purchaser, and the participants' actions in the typical transac-
tion encourage the purchaser to act to his detriment, legislation is
needed to void the attempt to establish the selling broker's sub-
agency relationship where it purports to arise merely as a result of
his membership with a multiple listing service.
